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The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations
and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we
investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players
in each interested party. While all players in a party share the same set
of resources, each player has her own preferences. Under additive valuations
drawn randomly from probability distributions, we show that when all groups
contain an equal number of players, a welfare-maximizing allocation is likely
to be envy-free if the number of items exceeds the total number of players by
a logarithmic factor. On the other hand, an envy-free allocation is unlikely
to exist if the number of items is less than the total number of players. In
addition, we show that a simple truthful mechanism, namely the random
assignment mechanism, yields an allocation that satisfies the weaker notion
of approximate envy-freeness with high probability.
1. Introduction
Dividing resources among interested parties in a fair manner is a problem that commonly
occurs in real-world situations and is consequently of fundamental importance. Countries
negotiate over international issues, as Egypt and Israel did in 1978 over interests in
the Sinai Peninsula [9] and the U.S. and Panama in 1994 over those in the Panama
Canal. Likewise, divorced couples negotiate over their marital property, airlines over
flight routes, and Internet clients over bandwidth and storage space. On a smaller
scale, typical everyday tasks involving fair division include distributing household tasks,
splitting a taxi fare, and sharing apartment rent [15]. Given its far-reaching and often
critical applications, it should not come as a surprise that fair division has long been a
popular topic of study in economics [12, 14, 22, 23, 28].
To reason about fair division, we must carefully define what we mean for a division to
be “fair”. Several notions of fairness have been proposed in the literature. For example,
a division is said to be proportional if every player values her allocation at least 1/n times
her value for the whole set of items, where n denotes the number of players. Another
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commonly-used notion of fairness, and one that we will work with throughout the paper,
is that of envy-freeness. A division of a set of items is said to be envy-free if each player
values the set of items that she receives at least as much as the set of items that any other
player receives. When utilities are additive, an envy-free division is proportional and
moreover satisfies another important fairness notion called the maximin share criterion.1
While procedures for finding envy-free divisions have been proposed [7, 8, 16], an envy-
free division does not necessarily exist in arbitrary settings. This can most easily be seen
in the case where there are two players and one item that both players value positively,
or more generally when the number of players exceeds the number of items and players
have positive values for items.
The fair division literature has for the most part assumed that each interested party
consists of a single player (or equivalently, several players represented by a single common
preference). However, this assumption is too restrictive for many practical situations.
Indeed, an outcome of a negotiation between countries may have to be approved by
members of the cabinets of each country. Since valuations of outcomes are usually
subjective, one can easily imagine a situation in which one member of a cabinet of a
country thinks that the division is fair while another member disagrees. Similarly, in a
divorce case, different members of the family on the husband side and the wife side may
have varying opinions on a proposed settlement. Another example is a large company
or university that needs to divide its resources among competing groups of agents (e.g.,
departments in a university), since the agents in each group can have misaligned interests.
Indeed, the professors who perform theoretical research may prefer more whiteboards
and open space in the department building, while those who engage in experimental
work are more likely to prefer laboratories.
In this paper, we study envy-free divisions when there are multiple players in each
group. Every player has her own preferences, and players in the same group can have
very different preferences. In this generalized setting, we consider a division to be envy-
free if every player values the set of items assigned to her group at least as much as that
assigned to any other group.
1.1. Our Contributions
In Section 3, we investigate the asymptotic existence and non-existence of envy-free
divisions using a probabilistic model, previously used in the setting with one player per
group [11]. We show that under additive valuations and other mild technical conditions,
when all groups contain an equal number of players, an envy-free division is likely to exist
if the number of goods exceeds the total number of players by a logarithmic factor, no
matter whether the players are distributed into several groups of small size or few groups
of large size (Theorem 1). In particular, any allocation that maximizes social welfare
is likely to be envy-free. In addition, when there are two groups with possibly unequal
numbers of players and the distribution on the valuation of each item is symmetric, an
envy-free division is likely to exist if the number of goods exceeds the total number of
1See, e.g., [6, 10] for the definition of the maximin share criterion.
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players by a logarithmic factor as well (Theorem 2). Although it might not be surprising
that a welfare-maximizing allocation is envy-free with high probability when there are
sufficiently many items, we find the fact that only an extra logarithmic factor is required
to be rather unexpected. Indeed, as the number of players in each group increases, it
seems as though the independence between the preferences of each player would make
it much harder to satisfy all of them simultaneously, since they all need to be allocated
the same items.
To complement our existence results, we show on the other hand that we cannot get
away with a much lower number of items and still have an envy-free division with high
probability. In particular, if the number of items is less than the total number of players
by a superconstant factor, or if the number of items is less than the total number of
players and the number of groups is large, we show that the probability that an envy-
free division exists is low (Corollaries 1 and 2). This leaves the gap between asymptotic
existence and non-existence of envy-free divisions at a mere logarithmic factor.
While the techniques used to show asymptotic existence of envy-free divisions in Sec-
tion 3 give rise to mechanisms that compute such divisions with high probability, these
mechanisms are unfortunately not truthful. In other words, implementing these mecha-
nisms in the presence of strategic players can lead to undesirable outcomes. In Section 4,
we tackle the issue of truthfulness and show that a simple truthful mechanism, namely
the random assignment mechanism, is α-approximate envy-free with high probability
for any constant α ∈ [0, 1) (Theorem 4). Approximate envy-freeness means that even
though a player may envy another player in the resulting division, the values of the
player for her own allocation and for the other player’s allocation differ by no more
than a multiplicative factor of α. In other words, the player’s envy is relatively small
compared to her value for her own allocation. The number of items required to obtain
approximate envy-freeness with high probability increases as we increase α. Our result
shows that it is possible to achieve truthfulness and approximate envy-freeness simulta-
neously in a wide range of random instances, and improves upon the previous result for
the setting with one player per group [2] in several ways.
1.2. Related Work
Our results in Section 3 can be viewed as generalizations of previous results by Dickerson
et al. [11], who showed asymptotic existence and non-existence under a similar model
but in a more limited setting where each group has only one player. In particular, these
authors proved that under certain technical conditions on the probability distributions,
an allocation that maximizes social welfare is envy-free with high probability if the
number of items is larger than the number of players by a logarithmic factor. In fact,
their result also holds when the number of players stay constant, as long as the number
of items goes to infinity. Similarly, we show that a welfare-maximizing allocation is likely
to be envy-free if the number of items exceeds the number of players by a logarithmic
factor. While we require that the number of player per group goes to infinity, the number
of groups can stay small, even constant. On the non-existence front, Dickerson et al.
showed that if the utility for each item is independent and identically distributed across
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players, then envy-free allocations are unlikely to exist when the number of items is larger
than the number of players by a linear fraction. On the other hand, our non-existence
results apply to the regime where the number of items is smaller than the number of
players. Note that while this regime is uninteresting in Dickerson et al.’s setting since
envy-free allocations cannot exist, in our generalized setting an envy-free allocation can
already exist when the number of items is at least the number of groups.
Besides the asymptotic results on envy-free divisions, results of this type have also
been shown for other fairness notions, including proportionality and the maximin share
criterion. These two notions are weaker than envy-freeness when utilities are additive.
Suksompong [25] showed that proportional allocations exist with high probability if the
number of goods is a multiple of the number of players or if the number of goods grows
asymptotically faster than the number of players. Kurokawa et al. [17] showed that
if either the number of players or the number of items goes to infinity, then an alloca-
tion satisfying the maximin share criterion is likely to exist as long as each probability
distribution has at least constant variance. Amanatidis et al. [3] analyzed the rate of
convergence for the existence of allocations satisfying the maximin share criterion when
the utilities are drawn from the uniform distribution over the unit interval. Another
common approach for circumventing the potential nonexistence of divisions satisfying
certain fairness concepts, which we do not discuss in this paper, is by showing approxima-
tion guarantees for worst-case instances [3, 4, 18, 21, 26, 27]. In particular, Suksompong
[26] investigated approximation guarantees for groups of agents using the maximin share
criterion.
Finally, a model was recently introduced that incorporates the element of resource allo-
cation for groups [19, 24]. The model concerns the problem of finding a small “agreeable”
subset of items, i.e., a small subset of items that a group of players simultaneously pre-
fer to its complement. Nevertheless, in that model the preferences of only one group
of players are taken into account, whereas in our work we consider the preferences of
multiple groups at the same time.
2. Preliminaries
Let a set N of n := gn′ players be divided into g ≥ 2 groups G1, . . . , Gg of n′ players
each, and let M := {1, 2, . . . ,m} denote the set of items. Let g(i) be the index of the
group containing player i (i.e., player i belongs to the group Gg(i)). Each item will
be assigned to exactly one group, to be shared among the members of the group. We
assume that each player i ∈ N has a cardinal utility ui(j) for each item j ∈ M . We
may suppose without loss of generality that ui(j) ∈ [0, 1], since otherwise we can scale
down all utilities by their maximum. We will also make a very common assumption that
utilities are additive, i.e., ui(M
′) =
∑
j∈M ′ ui(j) for any player i ∈ N and any subset of
items M ′ ⊆ M . The social welfare of an assignment is the sum of the utilities of all n
players from the assignment.
We are now ready to define the notion of envy-freeness. Denote the subsets of items
that are assigned to the g groups by M1, . . . ,Mg, respectively.
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Definition 1. Player i in group Gg(i) regards her allocation Mg(i) as envy-free if ui(Mg(i)) ≥
ui(Mj) for every group Gj 6= Gg(i). The assignment of the subsets M1, . . . ,Mg to the g
groups is called envy-free if every player regards her allocation as envy-free.
Next, we list two probabilistic results that will be used in our proofs. We first state
the Chernoff bound, which gives us an upper bound on the probability that a sum of
independent random variables is far away from its expected value.
Lemma 1 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xr be independent random variables that are
bounded in an interval [0, 1], and let S := X1 + · · ·+Xr. We have
Pr[S ≥ (1 + δ)E[S]] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[S]
3
)
,
and,
Pr[S ≤ (1− δ)E[S]] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[S]
2
)
for every δ ≥ 0.
Another lemma that we will use is the Berry-Esseen theorem. In short, it states that
a sum of a sufficiently large number of independent random variables behaves similarly
to a normal distribution. On the surface, this sounds like the central limit theorem.
However, the Berry-Esseen theorem relies on a slightly stronger assumption and delivers
a more concrete bound, which is required for our purposes.
Lemma 2 (Berry-Esseen theorem [5, 13]). Let X1, . . . ,Xr be r independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables, each of which has mean µ, variance σ2, and third
moment2 ρ. Let S := X1 + · · · +Xr. There exists an absolute constant CBE such that∣∣∣∣Pr[S ≤ x]− Pr
y∼N (µr,σ2r)
[y ≤ x]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ρCBEσ3√r
for every x ∈ R. Note that N (µr, σ2r) is the normal distribution with mean µr and
variance σ2r, i.e., its probability density function is
f(x) =
1
σ
√
2pir
e
−(x−µr)2
2σ2r .
Let us now state two assumptions on distributions of utilities; in Section 3 we will
work with the first and in Section 4 with the second.
[A1] For each item j ∈ M , the utilities ui(j) ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ N are drawn indepen-
dently at random from a distribution Dj . Each distribution Dj is non-atomic, i.e.,
Pr[ui(j) = x] = 0 for every x ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the variances of the distributions
are bounded away from zero, i.e., there exists a constant σmin > 0 such that the
variances of D1, . . . ,Dm are at least σ2min.
2The third moment of a random variable X is defined as E[|X − E[X]|3].
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[A2] For each i ∈ N and j ∈ M , the utility ui(j) ∈ [0, 1] is drawn independently
at random from a probability distribution Di,j. The mean of each distribution is
bounded away from zero, i.e., there exists a constant µmin > 0 such that E[ui(j)] ≥
µmin for every i ∈ N, j ∈M .
Note that assumption [A2] is weaker than [A1]. Indeed, in [A2] we do not require Di,j
to be the same for every i. In addition, since ui(j) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M , we
have E[ui(j)] ≥ E[ui(j)2] ≥ E[ui(j)2]−E[ui(j)]2 = Var(ui(j)). Hence, the condition that
the means of the distributions are bounded away from zero follows from the analogous
condition on the variances.
In Section 4, we consider the notion of approximate envy-freeness, which means that
for each player, there is no allocation of another group for which the player’s utility is
a certain (multiplicative) factor larger than the utility of the player for the allocation of
her own group. The notion is defined formally below.
Definition 2. We write Mp %
α
i Mq for α ∈ [0, 1] if and only if ui(Mp) ≥ αui(Mq).
Player i considers an assignment M1, . . . ,Mg of items to the g groups α-approximate
envy-free if Mg(i) %
α
i Mp for every group p ∈ {1, . . . , g}. We say that an assignment is
α-approximate envy-free if it is α-approximate envy-free for every player i.
Finally, we give the definition of a truthful mechanism, which we will use in Section 4.
Definition 3. A mechanism is a function that takes as input the utility of player i for
item j for all i ∈ N and j ∈M , and outputs a (possibly random) assignment of items to
the groups. A mechanism is said to be truthful if every player always obtains the highest
possible (expected) utility by submitting her true utilities to the mechanism, regardless of
the utilities that the remaining players submit.
3. Asymptotic Existence and Non-Existence of Fair Divisions
In this section, we study the existence and non-existence of fair divisions. First, we
show that, when m is Ω(n log n), where Ω(·) hides a sufficiently large constant, there
exists an envy-free division with high probability (Theorem 1). In particular, we prove
that a welfare-maximizing allocation is likely to be envy-free. This gives rise to a simple
algorithm that finds such a fair division with high probability. We also extend our
existence result to the case where there are two groups but the groups need not have
the same number of players; we show a similar result in this case, provided that each
distribution Dj satisfies an additional symmetry condition (Theorem 2).
Moreover, on the non-existence front, we prove that when m is smaller than n, the
probability that a fair division exists is at most 1/gn−m (Theorem 3). This has as
consequences that if the number of items is less than the total number of players by a
superconstant factor, or if the number of items is less than the total number of players
and the number of groups is large, then the probability that an envy-free division exists
is low (Corollaries 1 and 2).
We begin with our main existence result.
6
Theorem 1. Assume that [A1] holds. For any fixed σmin > 0, there exists a constant
C > 0 such that, for any sufficiently large n′, if m > Cn log n, then there exists an
envy-free assignment with high probability.
In fact, we not only prove that an envy-free assignment exists but also give a simple
greedy algorithm that finds one such assignment with high probability. The algorithm
idea is simple; we greedily assign each item to the group that maximizes the total utility
of the item with respect to the players in that group. This yields an allocation that
maximizes social welfare. The allocation is therefore Pareto optimal, i.e., there exists
no other allocation in which every player is weakly better off and at least one player is
strictly better off. The pseudocode of the algorithm is shown below.
Algorithm 1 Greedy Assignment Algorithm for Multiple Groups
1: procedure Greedy–Assignment–Multiple
2: let M1 = · · · =Mg = ∅.
3: for each item j ∈M do
4: choose k∗ from argmaxk=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk up(j)
5: let Mk∗ ←Mk∗ ∪ {j}
6: end for
7: end procedure
The analysis of the algorithm contains similarities to that of the corresponding result
in the setting with one player per group [11]. However, significantly more technical care
will be required to handle our setting in which each group contains multiple players.
This is reflected by our use of the Berry-Esseen theorem (Lemma 2). Here we provide
a proof sketch that contains all the high-level ideas but leaves out some tedious details,
especially calculations; the full proof can be found in the appendix.
Proof sketch of Theorem 1. We will first bound Pr[Mg′ ≻i Mg(i)] for each player i and
each group Gg′ 6= Gg(i); we then use the union bound at the end to conclude Theorem 1.
To bound Pr[Mg′ ≻i Mg(i)], we define a random variable Ai,j to be ui(j) if item j is
assigned to group Gg(i) and zero otherwise. Similarly, define B
g′
i,j to be ui(j) if the item
is assigned to group Gg′ and zero otherwise.
Intuitively, with respect to player i, Ai,j is the utility contribution of item j to the
group Gg(i). On the other hand, B
g′
i,j is the utility that is “lost” to group Gg′ . In
other words, Mg′ ≻i Mg(i) if and only if SA < SB , where SA =
∑
j∈M Ai,j and SB =∑
j∈M B
g′
i,j. We will use the Chernoff bound to estimate the probability of this event.
To do so, we first need to bound E[Ai,j] and E[B
g′
i,j ].
From symmetry between different groups, the probability that item j is assigned
to each group is 1/g. Thus, we have E[Ai,j ] =
1
g
E
[
ui(j) | item j is assigned to Gg(i)
]
and E[Bg
′
i,j ] =
1
g
E
[
ui(j) | item j is assigned to Gg′
]
. It is now fairly easy to see that
E[Bg
′
i,j] ≤ µj/g, where µj is the mean of Dj ; the reason is that the expected value of
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ui(j) when j is not assigned to Gg(i) is clearly at most µj. For convenience, we will
assume in this proof sketch that E[Bg
′
i,j] is roughly µj/g.
Now, we will bound the expected value of Ai,j. For each p = 1, . . . , g, let Xp denote
the sum of the utilities of item j with respect to all players in Gp. Due to symmetry
among players within the same group, we have
E[Ai,j ] =
1
n′g
E
[
Xg(i) | Xg(i) = max{X1, . . . ,Xg}
]
=
1
n′g
E[max{X1, . . . ,Xg}].
The latter equality comes from the symmetry between different groups.
Now, we use the Berry-Esseen theorem (Lemma 2), which tells us that each ofX1, . . . ,Xg
is close to N (µjn′,Ω(σ2minn′)). With simple calculations, one can see that the expec-
tation of the maximum of g identically independent random variables sampled from
N (µjn′,Ω(σ2minn′)) is µjn′ +Ω(σmin
√
n′). Roughly speaking, we also have
E [Ai,j] =
µj
g
+Ω
(
σmin
g
√
n′
)
.
Having bounded the expectations of Ai,j and B
g′
i,j, we are ready to apply the Chernoff
bound. Let δ = Θ
(
σmin
µj
√
n′
)
where Θ(·) hides some sufficiently small constant. When n′
is sufficiently large, we can see that (1 + δ)E[Bg
′
i,j] < (1 − δ)E[Ai,j ], which implies that
(1 + δ)E[SB ] < (1 − δ)E[SA]. Using the Chernoff bound (Lemma 1) on SA and SB, we
have
Pr[SA ≤ (1− δ)E[SA]] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[SA]
2
)
,
and,
Pr[SB ≥ (1 + δ)E[SB ]] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[SB ]
3
)
.
Thus, we have
Pr[SA < SB] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[SA]
2
)
+ exp
(−δ2 E[SB ]
3
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−Ω
(
σ2minm
nµj
))
(Since µj ≤ 1) ≤ 2 exp
(
−Ω
(
σ2minm
n
))
.
Recall that Pr[Mg′ ≻i Mg(i)] = Pr[SA < SB ]. Using the union bound for all i and all
g′ 6= g(i), the probability that the assignment output by the algorithm is not envy-free
is at most
2n(g − 1) exp
(
−Ω
(
σ2minm
n
))
,
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which is at most 1/m when m ≥ Cn log n for some sufficiently large C. This completes
the proof sketch for the theorem.
Unfortunately, the algorithm in Theorem 1 cannot be extended to give a proof for the
case where the groups do not have the same number of players. However, in a more
restricted setting where there are only two groups with potentially different numbers of
players and an additional symmetry condition on D1, . . . ,Dm is enforced, a result similar
to that in Theorem 1 can be shown, as stated in the theorem below.
Theorem 2. Assume that [A1] holds. Suppose that there are only two groups but not
necessarily with the same number of players; let n1, n2 denote the numbers of players of
the first and second group respectively (so n = n1 + n2). Assume also that D1, . . . ,Dm
are symmetric (around 1/2)3, i.e.,
Pr
X∼Dj
[
X ≤ 1
2
− x
]
= Pr
X∼Dj
[
X ≥ 1
2
+ x
]
for all x ∈ [0, 1/2]. For any fixed σmin > 0, there exists a constant C > 0 such that,
for any sufficiently large n1 and n2, if m > Cn log n, then there exists an envy-free
assignment with high probability.
The algorithm is similar to that in Theorem 1; the only difference is that, instead
of assigning each item to the group with the highest total utility over its players, we
assign the item to the group with the highest average utility, as seen in the pseudocode
of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Greedy Assignment Algorithm for Two Possibly Unequal-Sized Groups
1: procedure Greedy–Assignment–Two
2: let M1 =M2 = ∅.
3: for each item j ∈M do
4: choose k∗ from argmaxk=1,2
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)
nk
5: let Mk∗ ←Mk∗ ∪ {j}
6: end for
7: end procedure
The proof is essentially the same as that of Theorem 1 after the random variables
defined are changed corresponding to the modification in the algorithm. For instance,
Ai,j is now defined as
Ai,j = ui(j) · 1
[
g(i) = argmax
k=1,2
∑
p∈Gk up(j)
nk
]
where 1[E] denotes an indicator variable for event E.
3There is nothing special about the number 1/2; a similar result holds if the distributions are supported
on a subset of an interval [a, b] and are symmetric around (a+ b)/2, for some 0 < a < b.
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Due to the similarities between the two proofs, we will not repeat the whole proof.
Instead, we would like to point out that all the arguments from Theorem 1 work here
save for only one additional fact that we need to prove:
Proposition 1. Let X1 and X2 denote
∑
p∈G1 up(j)/n1 and
∑
p∈G2 up(j)/n2 respec-
tively. Then,
Pr[X1 ≥ X2] = 1
2
.
Proof. To show this, observe first that, since Dj is symmetric over 1/2, the distributions
of X1 and X2 are also symmetric over 1/2. Let f1 and f2 be the probability density
functions of X1 and X2 respectively, we have
Pr[X1 ≥ X2] =
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
f1(x)f2(y)dydx
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
f1(1− x)f2(1− y)dydx
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
f1(x)f2(y)dydx
= Pr[X2 ≥ X1].
Hence, Pr[X1 ≥ X2] = Pr[X2 ≥ X1] = 1/2, as desired.
Next, we state and prove an upper bound for the probability that an envy-free as-
signment exists when the number of players exceeds the number of items. Such an
assignment obviously does not exist under this condition if every group contains only
one player. In fact, the theorem holds even without the assumption that the variances
of D1, . . . ,Dm are at least σ2min > 0.
Theorem 3. Assume that [A1] holds. If m < n, then there exists an envy-free assign-
ment with probability at most 1/gn−m.
Proof. Suppose that m ≤ n− 1, and fix an assignment M1, . . . ,Mg. We will bound the
probability that this assignment is envy-free. Consider any player i in group Gg(i). The
probability that the assignment is envy-free for this particular player is the probability
that the total utility of the player for the bundle Mg(i) is no less than that for other
bundles Mj . This can be written as follows:
Pr
ui(1)∈D1,...,ui(m)∈Dm

 ∑
l∈Mg(i)
ui(l) = max
k=1,...,g
∑
l∈Mk
ui(l)

 .
For each j = 1, . . . , g, define pj as
pj = Pr
x1∈D1,...,xm∈Dm

∑
l∈Mj
xl = max
k=1,...,g
∑
l∈Mk
xl

 .
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Notice that the probability that the assignment is envy-free for player i is pg(i).
Since ui(1), . . . , ui(m) is chosen independently of ui′(1), . . . , ui′(m), for every i
′ 6= i,
the probability that this assignment is envy-free for every player is simply the product
of the probability that the assignment is envy-free for each player, i.e.,
n∏
i=1
pg(i) =
g∏
j=1
pn
′
j .
Using the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means, we arrive at the following
bound:
g∏
j=1
pn
′
j ≤

1
g
g∑
j=1
pj


n′g
.
Recall our assumption that the distributions Dj are non-atomic. Hence we may assume
that the events
∑
l∈Mj xl = maxk=1,...,g
∑
l∈Mk xl are disjoint for different j. This implies
that
∑g
j=1 pj = 1. Thus, the probability that this fixed assignment is envy-free is at
most 
1
g
g∑
j=1
pj


n′g
=
(
1
g
)n′g
=
1
gn
.
Finally, since each assignment is envy-free with probability at most 1/gn and there are
gm possible assignments, by union bound the probability that there exists an envy-free
assignment is at most 1/gn−m. This completes the proof of the theorem.
The following corollaries can be immediately derived from Theorem 3. They say that
an envy-free allocation is unlikely to exist when the number of items is less than the
number of players by a superconstant factor, or when the number of items is less than
the number of players and the number of groups is large.
Corollary 1. Assume that [A1] holds. When m = n − ω(1), the probability that there
exists an envy-free assignment converges to zero as n→∞.
Corollary 2. Assume that [A1] holds. When m < n, the probability that there exists an
envy-free assignment converges to zero as g →∞.
4. Truthful Mechanism for Approximate Envy-Freeness
While the algorithms in Section 3 translate to mechanisms that yield with high proba-
bility envy-free divisions that are compatible with social welfare assuming that players
are truth-telling, the resulting mechanisms suffer from the setback that they are easily
manipulable. Indeed, since they aim to maximize (total or average) welfare, strategic
players will declare their values for the items to be high, regardless of what the actual
11
values are. This presents a significant disadvantage: Implementing these mechanisms in
most practical situations, where we do not know the true valuations of the players and
have no reason to assume that they will reveal their valuations in a honest manner, can
lead to potentially undesirable outcomes.
In this section, we work with the weaker notion of approximate envy-freeness and
show that a simple truthful mechanism yields an approximately envy-free assignment
with high probability. In particular, we prove that the random assignment mechanism,
which assigns each item to a player chosen uniformly and independently at random, is
likely to produce such an assignment. In the setting where each group consists of only
one player, Amanatidis et al. [2] showed that when the distribution is as above and the
number of items m is large enough compared to n, the random assignment mechanism
yields an approximately envy-free assignment with high probability. Our statement is
an analogous statement for the case where each group can have multiple players.
Theorem 4. Assume that [A2] holds. For every α ∈ [0, 1), there exists a constant C
depending only on α and µmin such that, if m > Cg log n, then the random assignment,
where each item j ∈ M is assigned independently and uniformly at random to a group,
is α-approximate envy-free with high probability.
Before we prove Theorem 4, we note some ways in which our result is stronger than
that of Amanatidis et al.’s apart from the fact that multiple players per group are allowed
in our setting. First, Amanatidis et al. required Di,j to be the same for all j, which
we do not assume here. Next, they only showed that the random assignment is likely
to be approximately proportional, a weaker notion that is implied by approximate envy-
freeness. Moreover, in their result, m needs to be as high as Ω(n2), whereas in our case it
suffices form to be in the range Ω(g log n). Finally, we also derive a stronger probabilistic
bound; they showed a “success probability” of the algorithm of 1−O(n2/m), while our
success probability is 1− exp(−Ω(m/g)).
Proof of Theorem 4. For each player i ∈ N , each item j ∈M and each p ∈ {1, . . . , g}, let
Api,j be a random variable representing the contribution of item j’s utility with respect
to player i to group Gp, i.e., A
p
i,j is ui(j) if item j is assigned to group Gp and is zero
otherwise.
Define Spi :=
∑
j∈M A
p
i,j. Observe that each player i considers the assignment to be
α-approximate envy-free if and only if S
g(i)
i ≥ αSpi for every p. Let δ = 1−α1+α ; from this
choice of δ and since E[Spi ] is equal for every p, we can conclude that S
g(i)
i ≥ αSpi is
implied by S
g(i)
i ≥ (1− δ)E[Sg(i)i ] and Spi ≤ (1+ δ)E[Spi ]. In other words, we can bound
the probability that the random assignment is not α-approximate envy-free as follows.
Pr[∃i ∈ N, p ∈ {1, . . . , g} : Sg(i)i < αSpi ]
≤
∑
i∈N,p∈{1,...,g}
Pr[S
g(i)
i < αS
p
i ]
≤
∑
i∈N,p∈{1,...,g}
Pr[S
g(i)
i < (1− δ)E[Sg(i)i ] ∨ Spi > (1 + δ)E[Sg(i)i ]]
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≤
∑
i∈N,p∈{1,...,g}
(Pr[S
g(i)
i < (1− δ)E[Sg(i)i ]] + Pr[Spi > (1 + δ)E[Spi ]]).
Since Spi =
∑
j∈M A
p
i,j and A
p
i,j’s are independent and lie in [0, 1], we can use Chernoff
bound (Lemma 1) to upper bound the last terms. Hence, the probability that the
alloaction is not α-approximate envy-free is at most
∑
i∈N,p∈{1,··· ,g}
exp
(
−δ2 E[Sg(i)i ]]
2
)
+ exp
(−δ2 E[Spi ]]
3
)
.
Finally, observe that
E[Spi ] =
∑
j∈M
E[Api,j] =
∑
j∈M
1
g
E[ui(j)] ≥ mµmin
g
.
This means that the desired probability is bounded above by
∑
i∈N,p∈{1,...,g}
exp
(−δ2mµmin
2g
)
+ exp
(−δ2mµmin
3g
)
≤ 2ng exp
(−δ2mµmin
3g
)
≤ exp
(
−δ
2mµmin
3g
+ 3 log n
)
.
When m >
(
10
µminδ2
)
g log n, the above expression is at most exp(−Ω(m/g)), conclud-
ing our proof.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a generalized setting for fair division that allows interested parties
to contain multiple players, possibly with highly differing preferences. This setting
allows us to model several real-world cases of fair division that cannot be done under the
traditional setting. We establish almost-tight bounds on the number of players and items
under which a fair division is likely or unlikely to exist. Furthermore, we consider the
issue of truthfulness and show that a simple truthful mechanism produces an assignment
that is approximately envy-free with high probability.
While the assumptions of additivity and independence are somewhat restrictive and
might not apply fully to settings in the real world, our results give indications as to what
we can expect if the assumptions are relaxed, such as if a certain degree of dependence
is introduced. An interesting future direction is to generalize the results to settings with
more general valuations. In particular, if the utility functions are low-degree polynomials,
then one could try applying the invariance principle [20], which is a generalization of the
Berry-Esseen theorem that we use.
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We end the paper with some questions that remain after this work. A natural question
is whether we can generalize our existence and non-existence results (Theorems 1 and 3)
to the setting where the groups do not contain the same number of players. This non-
symmetry between the groups seems to complicate the approaches that we use in this
paper. For example, it breaks the greedy algorithm used in Theorem 1. Nevertheless, it
might still be possible to prove existence of an envy-free division using other algorithms
or without relying on a specific algorithm.
Another direction for future research is to invent procedures for computing envy-free
divisions, whenever such divisions exist, for the general setting where each group contains
multiple players and players have arbitrary (not necessarily additive) preferences. Even
procedures that only depend on rankings of single items [8] do not appear to extend
easily to this setting. Indeed, if a group contains two players whose preferences are
opposite of each other, it is not immediately clear what we should assign to the group.
It would be useful to have a procedure that produces a desirable outcome, even for a
small number of players in each group.
Lastly, one could explore the limitations that arise when we impose the condition of
truthfulness, an important property when we implement the mechanisms in practice.
For instance, truthful allocation mechanisms have recently been characterized in the
case of two players [1], and it has been shown that there is a separation between truthful
and non-truthful mechanisms for approximating maximin shares [2]. In our setting, a
negative result on the existence of a truthful mechanism that yields an envy-free division
with high probability would provide such a separation as well, while a positive result in
this direction would have even more consequences for practical applications.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
First we list the following well-known fact, which allows us to easily determine the mean
of a random variable from its cumulative density function.
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Proposition 2. Let X be a non-negative random variable. Then
E[X] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx.
To analyze the algorithm, consider any player i and any group g′ 6= g(i). We will first
bound the probability that Mg′ ≻i Mg(i). To do this, for each item j ∈M , define Ai,j as
Ai,j = ui(j) · 1

g(i) = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)

 ,
where 1
[
g(i) = argmaxk=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk up(j)
]
is an indicator random variable that indi-
cates whether g(i) = argmaxk=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk up(j). Similarly, define B
g′
i,j as
Bg
′
i,j = ui(j) · 1

g′ = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)

 .
Moreover, suppose that Dj has mean µj and variance σ2j .
Notice that, with respect to player i, Ai,j is the utility that item j contributes to
g(i) whereas Bg
′
i,j is the utility that item j contributes to g
′. In other words, Mg′ ≻i
Mg(i) if and only if
∑
j∈M Ai,j <
∑
j∈M B
g′
i,j. To bound Pr
[
Mg′ ≻i Mg(i)
]
, we will
first bound E [Ai,j] and E
[
Bg
′
i,j
]
. Then, we will use the Chernoff bound to bound
Pr
[∑
j∈M Ai,j <
∑
j∈M B
g′
i,j
]
.
Observe that, due to symmetry, we can conclude that
E

ui(j) · 1

g′ = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)



 = E

ui(j) · 1

g′′ = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)




for any g′′ 6= g(i). Thus, we can now rearrange Bg′i,j as follows:
E
[
Bg
′
i,j
]
=
1
g − 1

 ∑
g′′ 6=g(i)
E

ui(j) · 1

g′′ = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)






=
1
g − 1

E

ui(j) ∑
g′′ 6=g(i)
1

g′′ = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)






=
1
g − 1

E

ui(j)

1− 1

g(i) = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)







 .
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Hence, we have
E
[
Bg
′
i,j
]
=
1
g − 1 (µj − E [Ai,j]) . (1)
Now, consider Ai,j. Again, due to symmetry, we have
E [Ai,j] =
1
n′

 ∑
i′∈Gg(i)
E

ui′(j) · 1

g(i) = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)






=
1
n′
E



 ∑
i′∈Gg(i)
ui′(j)

 · 1

g(i) = argmax
k=1,...,g
∑
p∈Gk
up(j)



 .
Let S denote the distribution of the sum of n′ independent random variables, each
drawn from Dj . It is obvious that
∑
p∈Gk up(j) is drawn from S independently for each
k. In other words, E [Ai,j ] can be written as
E [Ai,j ] =
1
n′
E [X1 · 1 [X1 = max{X1, . . . ,Xg}]] .
The expectation on the right is taken over X1, . . . ,Xg sampled independently from S.
From symmetry among X1, . . . ,Xg, we can further derive the following:
E [Ai,j] =
1
n′
Pr [X1 = max{X1, . . . ,Xg}]E [X1 | X1 = max{X1, . . . ,Xg}]
=
1
n′g
E [X1 | X1 = max{X1, . . . ,Xg}]
=
1
n′g
E [max{X1, . . . ,Xg}] .
Consider the distribution of max{X1, . . . ,Xg}. Let us call this distribution Y. Notice
that E [max{X1, . . . ,Xg}] is just the mean of Y, i.e.,
E [Ai,j ] =
1
n′g
E
Y∼Y
[Y ]. (2)
To bound this, let FS and FY be the cumulative density functions of S and Y respec-
tively. Notice that FY (x) = FS(x)
g for all x. Applying Proposition 2 to S and Y yields
the following:
E
S∼S
[S] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− FS(x))dx,
and,
E
Y∼Y
[Y ] =
∫ ∞
0
(1− FS(x)g)dx.
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By taking the difference of the two, we have
E
Y∼Y
[Y ] = E
S∼S
[S] +
∫ ∞
0
FS(x)
(
1− FS(x)g−1
)
dx.
To bound the right hand side, recall that S is just the distribution of the sum of n′
independent random variables sampled according to Dj. Note that the third moment
of Dj is at most 1 because it is bounded in [0, 1]. Thus, by applying the Berry-Esseen
Theorem (Lemma 2), we have∣∣∣∣∣FS(x)− Pry∼N (µjn′,σ2jn′)[y ≤ x]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ CBEσ3j√n′ .
for all x ∈ R. When n′ is sufficiently large, the right hand side is at most 0.1.
Moreover, it is easy to check that Pry∼N (µjn′,σ2jn′)[y ≤ x] ∈ [0.5, 0.85] for every x ∈[
µjn
′, µjn′ + σj
√
n′
]
. Hence, FS(x) ∈ [0.4, 0.95] for every x ∈
[
µjn
′, µjn′ + σj
√
n′
]
.
Now, we can bound EY∼Y [Y ] as follows:
E
Y∼Y
[Y ] = E
S∼S
[S] +
∫ ∞
0
FS(x)
(
1− FS(x)g−1
)
dx
= µjn
′ +
∫ ∞
0
FS(x)
(
1− FS(x)g−1
)
dx
(Since FS(x)
(
1− FS(x)g−1
) ≥ 0) ≥ µjn′ +
∫ µjn′+σj√n′
µjn′
FS(x)
(
1− FS(x)g−1
)
dx
≥ µjn′ +
∫ µjn′+σj√n′
µjn′
(0.4)(0.05)dx
= µjn
′ + σj
√
n′/50
(Since σj ≥ σmin) ≥ µjn′ + σmin
√
n′/50.
Plugging the above inequality into equation (2), we can conclude that
E [Ai,j] =
1
n′g
E
Y ∈Y
[Y ] ≥ µj
g
+
σmin
50g
√
n′
.
From this and equation (1), we have
E
[
Bg
′
i,j
]
=
1
g − 1 (µj − E [Ai,j]) ≤
1
g − 1
(
µj − µj
g
)
=
µj
g
.
Now, define Cg
′
i,j as C
g′
i,j = B
g′
i,j +
(
µj/g − E
[
Bg
′
i,j
])
. Notice E
[
Cg
′
i,j
]
= µj/g.
As stated earlier, Mg′ ≻i Mg(i) if and only if
∑
j∈M Ai,j <
∑
j∈M B
g′
i,j. Let SA =∑
j∈M Ai,j, SB =
∑
j∈M B
g′
i,j, SC =
∑
j∈M C
g′
i,j and let δ =
σmin
200µj
√
n′
. Notice that, since
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we assume that the variance of Dj is positive, µj is also non-zero, which means that δ is
well-defined. Using Chernoff bound (Lemma 1) on SA and SC , we have
Pr[SA ≤ (1− δ)E[SA]] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[SA]
2
)
,
and,
Pr[SC ≥ (1 + δ)E[SC ]] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[SC ]
3
)
.
Moreover, when n′ is large enough, we have (1 − δ)E[SA] ≥ (1 + δ)E[SC ]. Thus, we
have
Pr[SA < SC ] ≤ exp
(−δ2 E[SA]
2
)
+ exp
(−δ2 E[SC ]
3
)
≤ exp
(−δ2mµj
2g
)
+ exp
(−δ2mµj
3g
)
≤ 2 exp
( −σ2minm
120000gn′µj
)
(Since µj ≤ 1) ≤ 2 exp
(−σ2minm
120000n
)
.
Due to how Cg
′
i,j is defined, we have Pr[SA < SC ] ≥ Pr[SA < SB] = Pr[Mg′ ≻i Mg(i)].
Using the union bound for all i and all g′ 6= g(i), the probability that the assignment
output by the algorithm is not envy-free is at most
2n(g − 1) exp
(−σ2minm
120000n
)
,
which is at most 1/m when m ≥ Cn log n for some sufficiently large C. This completes
the proof for the theorem.
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